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Abstract— Based on the observation that the trans-
parency of an algorithm comes with a cost for the
algorithm designer when the users (data providers) are
strategic, this paper studies the impact of strategic intent
of the users on the design and performance of transparent
ML algorithms. We quantitatively study the price of
transparency in the context of strategic classification
algorithms, by modeling the problem as a nonzero-sum
game between the users and the algorithm designer. The
cost of having a transparent algorithm is measured by
a quantity, named here as price of transparency which
is the ratio of the designer cost at the Stackelberg
equilibrium, when the algorithm is transparent (which
allows users to be strategic) to that of the setting where
the algorithm is not transparent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Classical Machine Learning (ML) algorithms operate
under several important yet often unstated assumptions:
that algorithm designer and data providers share a
known common classification goal, and that they are
both acting truthfully towards the goal (i.e., providers
transmit truthful information, and the designer only
uses it towards the stated, jointly agreed upon, goal).
However, recent technical works and investigations
have shown the limits of such a paradigm, and revealed
that many practical uses of ML involve, e.g., ”baked-in”
discrimination and/or hidden motives [1]. One approach
recently proposed to limit such occurrences of invidious
ML is to enforce some kind of ”transparency”, whereby
the goal and inner-workings of the algorithm would be
made public [2], [3]. Such transparency is desirable
for the data providers, since it prevents, in principle,
designers from acting untruthfully. However, making an
algorithm public could also open the door to gaming,
and adversely affect the classification outcome. In other
words, there are strong incentives against transparency,
even for a designer fully intent on working truthfully,
and it is thus essential to quantify the possible costs for
system designers, if algorithmic transparency is truly to
become a widespread requirement.
The goal of this paper is to propose and compute
a metric to evaluate the ”price of transparency” (PoT)
for specific classes of classifiers, by treating the clas-
sification task as a non-cooperative game between data
providers and designer, and considering ”transparency”
as a widening of the common knowledge available
to both players, with respect to the non-transparent
version. Particularly, transparency implies that the in-
formation providers know in what context the data will
be used
In this paper, we propose and analyze a metric for
transparency, similar to the notion of price of anarchy
(PoA) in multi-player non-cooperative games, but com-
pares the performance attained at the (provably unique)
Stackelberg equilibrium afforded by the widened trans-
parent structure (rather than worst Nash in the PoA) to
the best non-strategic attainable performance. In that
sense, the models considered in this work are also
similar to adversarial ML ones, with the important
difference that we explicitly consider equilibria only
attainable with a ”transparent game structure”.
Let us concretize this notion of transparency in the
context of clustering (classification) algorithms in the
following practical examples.
Recommendation letter: Consider a professor asked
for a recommendation letter for a faculty job application
of her graduating PhD student. The objective the search
committee is to determine the candidates that would be
invited for an onsite interview, based on the quality of
recommendation letters. In other words, the committee
infers the qualifications of the candidate based on the
receiver letters, in order to make a binary decision:
to invite or not invite the candidate onsite. In many
cases, the professor might be biased in favor of the
student since she wants her student to get the job,
i.e., the objective of the professor is to render the
committee’s inference to be somewhat better than the
candidate’s actual qualifications. However, the profes-
sor is not unboundedly biased, since she does not want
to compromise her reliability. Also, the bias of the
professor is highly correlated with the student’s actual
qualifications: if she is not a good student, the professor
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has no incentive for bias; or alternatively, if the student
is extremely successful, she does not need the profes-
sor’s bias, and the professor has no incentive of risking
her credibility. The committee, having received many
letters, know that the letters are somewhat biased. How
should the committee design their classifier (choose the
candidates that will be invited for onsite interviews)?
Dance class: Consider a parent registering his
daughter to a dance class. The information sought at
the registration office, her birthday, weight, height etc,
is somewhat private to the parent so he is hesitant to
provide the truthful, accurate answers to such queries.
The truthfulness of the answers given by the parent
depends on the question asked. However, he still wants
her to go to the correct dancing class (which is deter-
mined using such private information by the registration
office by a transparent algorithm). Given the parent’s
concern about privacy conflicting with his preference
that she would be assigned to correct dancing class,
how should he report his daughter’s information? How
should the registration office assign the students to
different classes?
Number of books: This example originates from
the main motivating example of [4], but also involves
a subtle but important modification: Social studies
have shown that a student’s success can be very well
predicted from the number of books in the parents’
household [5]. However, this feature cannot be used
in actual school admissions simply because when it is
publicly known that this is a factor in admission (if the
algorithm is transparent), the parents will simply obtain
several books to increase chances of their children
admitted to top schools. We note however that the
parents have some inference on the child’s abilities:
not every student can succeed in top schools; therefore,
the bias (additional books bought by the parents) is not
unbounded, and it may indeed be correlated with the
actual qualifications of the child. In [4], this bias incurs
an explicit cost to the users (the data providing agent).
Here, we do not assume such a cost, but instead we
assume both agents’ strategies are transparent, i.e., the
classifier designer knows, in a statistical sense, how
much the users are misreporting.
In summary, transparency of an algorithm comes
with a cost for the algorithm designer when the users
(data providers) are strategic. In this paper, leveraging
the recent results on strategic communication in [6],
and using the well-known results in vector quantization
theory, we analyze the impact of strategic intent of data
provider on the design and performance of transparent
ML algorithms. In other words, we analytically study
the price of transparency in the context of strategic
ML algorithms.
More formally, we study transparency in the sense of
Stackelberg equilibrium of a non-zero sum information
transmission game: the machinery of the algorithm (the
strategy of the receiver in the information transmission
game) is known to the strategic individuals (the senders
of the game) who provide the training and test data. In
return, the strategic intent and the functional form of the
data generation (how the bias is statistically introduced
into the data), are known to the ML algorithm designer.
In game theory terms, this setting can be viewed as
a Stackelberg signaling game between two agents: a
sender (strategic data provider) and a receiver (the ML
algorithm designer). The objective of the receiver is
to design a classifier that would classify the samples
of X with minimal error (measured by a distortion
metric, such as mean squared error). The objective of
the sender is deceive the receiver to render it’s classifier
to be close to X+Θ, where Θ is a bias random variable,
correlated with X . The statistics of X and Θ as well
as the strategies of both agents are common knowledge
(known to both agents). The data provider (sender)
is restricted to pure strategies and it is the leader,
and the algorithm designer (receiver) is the follower,
who observes the sender’s choice of pure strategies
and plays accordingly to minimize its own distortion
with the knowledge of the mappings of the sender. We
analyze the value of this game, in conjunction with
optimal strategies for both agents, to deduce the cost
associated with the strategic aspect of the data provider
due to the transparency of the algorithm.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we give a detailed description of our
classification game and the players involved. Before
discussing the strategic considerations, we give a brief
technical overview of the unsupervised classification
problem as well as key properties of minimum mean-
squared error estimators; all results presented here are
well known.
Notation: We let R and R+ denote the respective
sets of real numbers and positive real numbers. Let
E(·) denote the expectation operator. S denotes the set
of Borel measurable, square integrable functions {f :
R→ R}. We use standard game theoretic notations for
the related results throughout this paper (cf. [7]).
Y
g(X, ✓) h(Y ) XˆX, ✓
Fig. 1. Strategic Communication
A. Clustering (Quantization, Unsupervised Learning)
Here, we review optimal clustering which is also
known as the quantization or the unsupervised learning
problem in different disciplines. We use the term ”quan-
tizer” to highlight the connection between machine
learning and the quantization theory in which we use
some well-known results. A quantizer is defined by
a set of reconstruction points and a partition. The
partition P = {Pi} associated with a classifier is a col-
lection of disjoint regions whose union covers RK . The
reconstruction points R = {ri} are typically chosen to
minimize a distortion measure (such as mean squared
error). The quantizer is a mapping QK : RK → RK
that maps every vector X ∈ RK into the reconstruction
point that is associated with the cell containing X , i.e.
QK(X) = ri if X ∈ Pi, ∀i. (1)
Throughout this paper, the optimal quantizer, that is the
quantizer that minimizes MSE, is denoted by QNN or
the nearest neighbor quantizer.
Next, let assume that Y is the strategically reported
version of the source X . Y can be viewed as the output
of a channel, p(Y |X) whose input is X . Y is to be
classified by a k-level quantizer Q such that the mean
squared distortion E{||X − Q(Y )||2} is as small as
possible. This k level quantizer is characterized by
its reconstruction points {y1, . . . , yk} ⊂ RK and the
measurable sets Pi = {x ∈ Rk : Q(x) = yi}, i =
1, . . . , k which are partitions. It is well known (see e.g.,
[8]) that the following useful decomposition holds for
any Q:
E||X−Q(Y )||2 =E||X−Xˆ||2+E||Xˆ(Y )−Q(Y )||2 (2)
where Xˆ(Y ) = E{X|Y }. Thus, to minimize E{||X−
Q(Y )||2}, the quantizer has to minimize E{||Xˆ(Y )−
Q(Y )||2}. Therefore, the quantizer minimizing1 E||X−
Q(Y )||2 is obtained by first transforming Y to Xˆ =
E{X|Y } and then quantizing Xˆ by a nearest neighbor
quantizer Q. Moreover, the overall distortion can be
written as the sum of two terms:
E{||X −Q(Y )||2} = DEST +DQ
1Such a minimizer exists, see e.g., [9].
where DEST = E{||X − Xˆ||2} is the estimation dis-
tortion, and DQ = E{||Xˆ −Q(Xˆ)||2} is the distortion
associated with the quantization operation. Throughout
this work, we choose K = 1 (use scalar quantizers)
for the ease of exposition, although, in principle, our
results are valid for any dimension, K. The set of k-
level classifiers (that is, the set of scalar quantizers with
k partitions) is denoted here by Q(k).
In general, the optimal quantization map is highly
nonlinear and intractable. Hence, there are several com-
mon assumptions to facilitate analysis in quantization
theory, one of which will be used in the sequel.
Assumption 1. Quantization distortion of a random
variable X ,
D
(k)
Q (σ
2
X) = min
Q∈Q(k)
E{(X −Q(X))2}
is only a function of its variance σ2X and the number
of partitions (k) of the quantizer.
This assumption, also known as the high resolution
(high rate) quantization theory [10], holds for asymptot-
ically high number of clusters and dithered quantizers.
In practice, it is a good model for medium to high
resolution for most signals and it is commonly used to
analyze quantization distortion in filterbanks etc.
In this paper, we focus on scalar Gaussian variables,
for which the optimal quantization rules and MSE
distortions are well-studied and reported in e.g., Table
1 in [11].
B. Strategic Communication
There exists a substantial amount of literature in in-
formation economics on communicating information in
senser-receiver games: using as advertising [12], [13],
education [14], disclosure of verifiable information
[15], or cheap talk [16], or information disclosure[17],
[18]. Here, we adopt the information disclosure model
in [17] and [18] since it fits best to the transparent
strategic classification setting at hand.
More formally, we consider a Stackelberg game (as
opposed to Nash equilibria considered in the classical
literature in Information Economics [16]), where the
sender is the leader and the receiver is the follower.
The game proceeds as follows: the sender plays first
and announces an encoding mapping. As a leader in
Stackelberg game, the sender is committed to its encod-
ing mapping, i.e., the sender cannot change it after the
receiver plays. The receiver, knowing this commitment,
determines its own mapping that maximizes its pay-off,
given the encoding map. The sender, of course, will
anticipate this, and pick its map accordingly. Note that
there is a natural order in this model of communication:
the sender cannot change its mapping after the receiver
announces the decoding strategy. Hence, a Stackelberg
model is a better fit to such kind of communication
systems with a natural order of communication, rather
than Nash equilibria where the transmitter is not com-
mitted to its own mapping and can change it after the
receiver announces the decoding mapping.
In this paper, we focus on the general communication
system whose block diagram is shown in Figure 1. The
source X and bias Θ are mapped into Y ∈ R, via a
stochastic mapping Y = g(X,Θ) so that
P(g(X,Θ) ∈ Y) =
∫
y′∈Y
p(y′|x,Θ) dy′ ∀Y ⊆ R
(3)
holds almost everywhere in X and Θ. Let the set of
all such mappings be denoted by Γ (which has a one-
to-one correspondence to the set of all the conditional
distributions that construct the transmitter output Y ).
We take the source and bias variables jointly Gaus-
sian, i.e., (X,Θ) ∼ N (0, RXΘ) where, without any
loss of generality, RXΘ is parametrized as
RXΘ = σ
2
X
[
1 ρ
ρ r
]
,
with r > ρ2. The receiver produces an estimate of the
source Xˆ through a mapping h ∈ S as Xˆ = h(Y ). The
objective of the receiver is to minimize
DR = E
{(
X − Xˆ
)2}
(4)
while that of the sender is to minimize
DS = E
{(
X + Θ− Xˆ
)2}
(5)
over the mappings g(·, ·) ∈ Γ, h(·) ∈ S. We note that
the sender can augment its map with any other invert-
ible function and the receiver can do the reverse and
achieve the same costs, i.e., the mappings F (g(X, θ))
and F−1(h(Y )) yield the same costs as g(X, θ) and
h(Y ), where F (·) is any invertible function. This
function corresponds to different permutations of labels
if the message space is finite as assumed in most prior
work in the Economics literature[16], [17], [18]. To
account for such trivially equivalent pairs of mappings,
we use the term “essentially unique”, defined explicitly
in the following:
Definition 1 (Essential Uniqueness). A mapping g :
R × R → R is essentially unique if it is unique upto
bijective transformations.
The optimal strategies for this communication game
are derived in [6] and reproduced below:
Theorem 1 ([6]). The essentially unique mappings at
the Stackelberg equilibrium are given as g∗(X, θ) =
X + αθ and h∗(Y ) = κY , where α and κ are:
α =
A− 1
2(r + ρ)
, κ =
1 + αρ
1 + α2r + 2αρ
(6)
Costs at this Stackelberg solution are
DS =σ
2
X
(
1 +
(A− 3)(r + ρ)
A− 1
)
(7)
DR =σ
2
X
(
(r − ρ2)(A− 1)
A(2r +Aρ+ ρ)
)
(8)
where A =
√
1 + 4(r + ρ).
C. Our Model
We consider a Stackelberg game between the data
provider and the clustering algorithm designer. The data
provider (Sender) is the leader and algorithm designer
(Receiver) is the follower. The objective of the receiver
is to classify the samples of X , given a fixed number
of partitions, denoted here as k, with minimal MSE
over the signal X . The objective of the sender (user)
is deceive the receiver to render the classifier output
close to X + Θ where Θ is a bias random variable,
correlated with X . The statistics of X and Θ as well
as the strategies of both agents are common knowledge
(known to both agents, due to the transparency of the
algorithm).
We consider here quadratic objectives: the objective
of Receiver is to minimize
JR = E
{
(X − h(Y ))2
}
(9)
over the designed k-level classification map h : R →
{r1, . . . , rk}, while that of Sender is to minimize
JS = E
{
(X + Θ− h∗(Y ))2
}
(10)
over Y = g(X,Θ) ∈ Γ, where h∗ denotes the optimal
classifier mapping as a function of g(·, ·), i.e.,
h∗(g(X,Θ)) = arg min
h∈Q(k)
E{(X − h(g(X,Θ)))2}
Y
g(X, ✓)
h(Y )
XˆX, ✓ Xˆ(Y ) QNN (Xˆ)} r
Fig. 2. The strategic classification game with the optimal classifier map.
that holds for any given g(X, θ). We let g∗(X,Θ)
denote the optimal mapping for the data provider, i.e.,
g∗(X,Θ) = arg min
g∈Γ
E
{
(X + Θ− h∗(g(X,Θ)))2
}
.
(11)
Next, we define the Price of Transparency (PoT ).
Definition 2 (Price of Transparency). Price of trans-
parency (PoT ) is the ratio of the clustering costs
at the Stackelberg equilibrium (i.e., the algorithm is
transparent) and the non-strategic setting (i.e., the
algorithm is not transparent):
PoT =
J∗R
J∗∗R
,
where
J∗R = min
h∈Q(k)
E
{
(X − h(Y ))2 |Y = g∗(X,Θ)
}
and
J∗∗R = min
h∈Q(k)
E
{
(X − h(Y ))2 |Y = X
}
,
and g∗(X,Θ) is given in (11).
III. MAIN RESULTS
Before the characterization and numerical analysis
of PoT, we first analyze the structure of the optimal
strategies of the classifier designer and the data provider
(user).
A. Optimal Strategies
The following theorem states the strategies achieving
the Stackelberg equilibrium.
Theorem 2. There exists a unique Stackelberg equilib-
rium with the following data providing map
g∗(X,Θ)= X+αΘ, (12)
where
α =
−1 +√1 + 4(r + ρ)
2(r + ρ)
,
and the following classifier
h(·) = QNN (·) ◦ Xˆ(·)
where Xˆ(Y ) = E {X|Y = g∗(X,Θ)} and QNN (·) is
the optimal (nearest neighbor) classifier.
Proof: The optimal strategy for the classifier
follows from (2), i.e., first estimate X from Y via
MMSE estimation, denoted here as Xˆ(Y ), and then
quantize Xˆ(Y ) with the optimal nearest neighbor clas-
sifier Q(Xˆ), designed for Xˆ . The data provider’s cost,
in conjunction with this classifier, JS can be expressed
as:
JS = E{(X+Θ−Xˆ(Y ))2}+ E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y ))2}
+ 2E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y )))(X+Θ−Xˆ(Y ))} (13)
The first term above, DS = E{(X+Θ−Xˆ(Y ))2}, is
the sender cost of the communication game outlined in
Section II-B. Theorem 1 implies that g∗(X,Θ) in (12)
is the unique minimizer of DS .
The last term in (13) is the sum of two terms
E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y )))(X−Xˆ(Y ))} and E{Θ (Xˆ(Y )−
Q(Xˆ(Y )))}. The first one vanishes since estimation
error X − Xˆ(Y ) is orthogonal to any deterministic
function of the observation Y . The second one can
be expressed as in (14). where fΘ(·) is the density
of Θ. Noting the fact that optimal quantizer (classi-
fier) is an unbiased estimator, i.e., E{Q(Xˆ(Y ))|Θ} =
E{Xˆ(Y )|Θ} almost surely in Θ, we conclude that this
term also vanishes.
The second term E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y )))2} is the
quantization error of the estimate Xˆ(Y ). Note that
g∗(X,Θ) in the theorem statement minimizes DS(σ2X)
subject to fixed DR. Fixing DR(σ2X) implies that σ
2
Xˆ
is fixed since,
DR(σ
2
X) = σ
2
X − σ2Xˆ
E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y ))) Θ} =
∫
E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y )))|Θ = θ}θfΘ(θ)dθ (14)
by the basic orthogonality principle of estimation. Since
E{(Xˆ(Y )−Q(Xˆ(Y )))2} = D(k)Q (σ2Xˆ) is only a function
of the estimate variance σ2
Xˆ
(by Assumption 1) which
is fixed, we conclude that g∗(X,Θ) minimizes JS ,
which implies the optimality of g∗(X,Θ) when used
in conjunction with the optimal h(·).
B. Characterization of PoT
In the following, we present a characterization of
PoT for our setting.
Theorem 3. The price of transparency is
PoT =
DR(σ
2
X) +D
(k)
Q (σ
2
Xˆ
)
D
(k)
Q (σ
2
X)
,
where σ2X is the source variance and σ
2
Xˆ
is the variance
of the receiver’s estimate in the strategic communica-
tion game.
Proof: The value of PoT can simply be found by
plugging the relevant expressions.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSIONS
This paper constitutes a first attempt to quantitatively
analyze the cost of transparency in ML algorithms,
specializing to classification/clustering type of ML
problems. We have conducted a game theoretical anal-
ysis of strategic classification/clustering for a jointly
Gaussian source-bias model. Building on the recent
prior work on strategic communication, we have shown
how the price of transparency changes with the joint
statistics of bias and source, and also the number of
classification regions. Several practical problems are,
including an investigation of optimal strategies if the
source statistics is not available apriori but estimated
from the strategically generated training samples? The
quantization theory provides some starting points for
this problem [19], [20], which will be pursued as a
part of our future work.
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